A Bugged 1963 Conclave?

When John XXIII died, the future of relations between the Vatican and the Eastern bloc depended on the choice of his successor. Mgr Casaroli meanwhile was obliged to stop travelling behind the Iron Curtain and await further instructions. At the Geneva disarmament conference, the American and Soviet delegates put their bitter debates aside for a day to participate in a unanimous homage to the deceased Pope. No doubt relieved by John XXIII’s departure, the CIA got back to work at once, evaluating the various scenarios for the succession to the Papacy.

On 15 June 1963, President Kennedy received the following report:

Country: Italy Report No TDCS DB-3/654,973

Subject:  Successor to Pope John XXIII

Situation appraisal

Source:  Staff officer of this organization

Commentary: Following is a [CIA] appraisal of the present situation. It is not an official judgment by this Agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on the information available to him at the time of its preparation. Prepared for internal use, this commentary is disseminated in the belief that it may be useful to the Department of State in assessing the situation for its purposes.

Based on background knowledge, exhaustive scanning, and discussions with persons in various fields, the following speculations concerning the successor of Pope John XXIII are offered.

A complicating factor in predicting who the next pope will be is the increased size of the College of Cardinals, which is now 82, compared to 55 in 1958. The average time that the 1958 group had been cardinals was much longer than the average for the present group. Moreover, in 1958, it was much easier to identify each of the cardinals with one of three major categories: Liberal, Conservative, or Moderate. The present College contains 44 cardinals created by John XXIII, but some are far from being in the Liberal group …

The possibility of a non-Italian pope might be examined first … In our opinion such an eventuality is unlikely […]

A prime consideration is certain to be the next pope’s attitude towards Vatican Council II and Pope John’s policies in general. We think that the prevailing mood will be to continue them, but perhaps to check certain aspects which many cardinals, including some Italian, think have gone too far. This is especially true with respect to Church relations with the Communist world, which seems to have created some chinks in the non-Italian Liberal front. Even if Pope John’s successor is committed to his general policies, the tendency is usually to go more slowly and to take stock. It might also be said that what is needed now is not innovation, but implementation. It is difficult to see how the conclave can ignore the fact that Pope John’s reign has created a definite worldwide image of the papacy and of great expectations and that they now must in some manner be carried forward. It might be argued that cardinals have never shown themselves to be overly concerned with public opinion, but public opinion regarding the Church has never been brought to bear or stirred up to the extent it has in recent years …

It does not seem likely that an interim candidate will be sought, barring an unbreakable deadlock, since what Pope John’s policies need now is continuity. It is felt that the average age of serious contenders will be at least lower than John’s was and that it will tend more to return to what has been the age of popes over the last 150 years. While this might appear arbitrary, it would eliminate 15 of 28 Italians, some of whom are not likely candidates for other considerations of health and policies too …

All of the foregoing are over 75. Of the 13 remaining Italians, [3] might be eliminated because they are known as definite opponents of Pope John’s policies […]

Among the strongly committed Liberals, Montini of Milan stands out and almost everyone queried comes up with his name sooner rather than later. Montini is certainly going into the conclave as the favourite of the masses.

In short, though the CIA preferred by far to see the conservative Siri from Genoa appointed, even before the conclave started, it produced a rather lucid assessment of the situation, without confusing its wishes with reality. Although the reign of John XXIII was brief, he had appointed more than half of the cardinals who were getting ready to vote during the conclave. And his policy of openness to the East was not going to come to a stop. The Vatican didn’t work in fits and starts. Aware that the champion of anti-communism, Cardinal Siri, could not attract the centrist votes that were vital for him to be elected, a group of Italian, Spanish and South American cardinals agreed to support Cardinal Ildebrando Antoniutti, who had spent nine years as nuncio in Madrid and who was liked by Franco. The liberals, who included 6 Italians, 4 Americans, 2 Germans and 8 Frenchmen, by themselves couldn’t reach the two-thirds majority required, i.e. 55 votes.

A few hours before he left for the conclave, Cardinal Spellman was visited at his residence by a CIA officer who wanted to talk to him about observations that had been made on the stakes involved in the succession. The shift to the left made by John XXIII had had a dangerous result in South America, where a number of socially concerned priests inspired by the Pacem in Terris encyclical were becoming involved and taking a position in their sermons against the local governments, all of which strengthened the communists. What were the chances, asked the CIA man, of electing a pope who would slow down this dangerous development? Spellman, who had never missed an opportunity to go and support American troops in Korea and Vietnam, had not been one of John XXIII’s admirers. When his friend Pius XII passed away, his political influence in the Vatican started to wane. The three other American cardinals were clearly in favour of the liberals. And Spellman didn’t even agree with the choice of the conservatives who wanted to support Antoniutti, a figure he thought was insignificant. In his opinion, only Siri was worthy of his support. But he wasn’t going to explain openly that he was no longer the “American pope” he had once been, so he could only give an evasive answer.*

The young visitor then came to the real reason for his visit. The CIA needed to know the conclave’s outcome before anybody else. The international stakes were very high. Political issues would certainly be an important part of the debates. The CIA would in this way be able to send the name of the new pope to the Langley HQ before all the media on the spot.

For the members of the Italian services who were following the conclave, there were only two possibilities: the CIA had succeeded in placing microphones, or it had an informer among the cardinals. He would have had to be equipped with a radio transmitter, since the cardinals had no access to a telephone. In the now declassified CIA archives, no indication can be found enabling one to know more. But one thing is certain: if a cardinal had dared to carry a radio transmitter during the conclave, there was only one possible candidate bold and committed enough and on the side of the American secret services: Spellman.

^{*See John Cooney, The American Pope: The Life and Times of Francis, Cardinal Spellman, Times Books, 1984.}

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